Andrew Lichterman
The headlines in recent weeks have been full of the latest “threat,” this time a possible missile test by North Korea. The Bush administration has filled the airways once again with bellicose rhetoric, ranging from the now-routine “all options are on the table” to threats to shoot the missile down with U.S. ballistic missile defense interceptors. As Jeff Lewis and Victoria Sampson argue persuasively in a series of posts at Armscontrolwonk.com, the shoot-down talk is almost certainly an empty threat, intended only for consumption by those who know nothing about either ballistic missile defense or the likely trajectory of North Korean missile tests.
Not to be outdone, leading Democratic Party “national security” figures, including Clinton-era Defense Secretary William Perry, are suggesting a pre-emptive strike against the North Korean launch site, claiming that the outcome of this unvarnished act of aggression would be not only predictable but positive. The mainstream media and U.S. political elites seem permanently locked in a deadly symbiotic embrace: for the media, “if it bleeds it leads,” for the political elites, “if we kill it sells.” Or so it seems, more and more in this grim new American Century, where “diplomacy” seems to mean little more to those who wield American power than threatening force for a bit longer before using it.
The confrontation between the U.S. military behemoth and North Korea’s possible nuclear weapons and its still-theoretical long range missile capability works well enough, in any case, for the elites of both states, each growing progressively more isolated from the rest of the world, although in different ways. What each may fear most is their own growing irrelevance: North Korea to the world as a whole, the United States to East Asia, where convincing key states– such as Japan and South Korea–that it remains an “indispensable nation” is a critical element in slowing U.S. descent from the zenith of its power (now clearly in the rear-view mirror of the U.S. juggernaut, however much we may debate how many mileposts have passed since the peak). For North Korea, fueling up the missile (if that is what they actually are doing) gets the world’s attention by slapping the “rogue leader with nukes (maybe)” bargaining chip on the table once more, particularly with the U.S. government and its echo-chamber media playing the role of both predictable antagonist and massive message amplifier. Thomas Schelling, Henry Kissinger and company may have invented the “madman theory” of deterrence and diplomacy, but no one has gotten more mileage off less fuel with it than North Korea.
As for U.S. elites, the North Korean “threat,” particularly with the added fillip of an endless nuclear and missile crisis, is a good excuse for the U.S. to maintain its massive military presence in the region. It also is a major selling point for ballistic missile defense, both at home and abroad. Defenses against strategic missiles are an arms contractor’s dream: arcane, extremely expensive technology, for which there is a potentially unlimited demand, that is unlikely to be tested in any battle likely to be followed by rational debate over its success or failure. In this regard, the current round of North Korea missile-threat fear mongering may already have served its purpose. Last week the United States and Japan inked a pact for further cooperation on missile defense development, and this week Japan agreed to the deployment of Patriot 3 missiles, designed for defense against aircraft, cruise missiles, and shorter range missiles. While neither of these agreements may have been caused by the current North Korea missile test scare, they may provide useful political cover for the government of Japan, where increased cooperation with the U.S. military is controversial.
Largely unnoticed in this country (except by the Washington Post’s William Arkin), the North Korean missile “crisis” also coincided with “Valiant Shield 2006,” described by the military “as the largest joint exercise in recent history.” Conducted in the Western Pacific, it involved three Navy carrier groups, hundreds of aircraft, and over twenty thousand military personnel from all the services. We likely will never know the exact relationship between this massive show of force and the North Korean missile preparations (if indeed there are such). Who made the first “threat” in this round of high-stakes ritual posturing? All we can know for sure is that what appears on the front pages bears only the most distant relationship to any truth worth knowing.
“Valiant Shield” was preceded by a “joint photo exercise” which ” featured 14 ships as well as 17 aircraft from Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corp including a B2 bomber.” Its purpose and message was clear. At the cost of many millions of dollars, the “Photoex” undoubtedly will provide crucial support to the legions of Pentagon budget warriors, providing vital imagery for the next several years of PowerPoint presentations. The message: give us more, more, always more.
In this festival of violent posturing, the U.S. announcement that it was activating its U.S.-based ballistic missile interceptors stood out as a particularly surreal moment. It is probably best understood as one in a long line of Bush Administration production numbers staged in front of one or another false background– a brightly lit and carefully sanitized New Orleans square, the rubble and despair carefully effaced by the surrounding darkness, the Iraq war “triumph” of “mission accomplished” declared by a President in a pilot outfit symbolizing the military service he in fact largely evaded, on the deck of an aircraft carrier half a planet away from a devastated country where the war had just begun. Now, a threat to use a “missile defense system” that likely can’t hit a thing, to shoot down a missile launch that could be anything from a propaganda gambit (ours or theirs) to a peaceful satellite launch, that if it does occur likely will have a trajectory outside the range of U.S. based interceptors. Another day, another advertisement for fear, for war, and for the promise of high-tech weapons as the solution to all our problems.
Also in the rear view mirror of U.S. elites in their accelerating descent from global hegemony is their projection of a global order based on the rule of law. Bare-knuckled threats against North Korea are only the latest bit of evidence that lawfulness of any kind now takes last place in the U.S. approach to any foreign policy “crisis,” real or manufactured. Global hegemony to a considerable degree requires consent. A vision of the rule of law in international affairs played a central role in the ideology deployed by the U.S. to garner such consent in its period of greatest power, in the decades after WWII. Although often contradicted by U.S. actions, its most basic tenets, such as the prohibitions against wars of aggression and against torture, have not been openly rejected until now.
The advocacy by several members of the Democratic Party national security “A team” of a brazen attack against a country that poses no imminent threat to the United States, and that has no reason to launch a war against us, manifests the breadth and depth of the moral, legal, and diplomatic bankruptcy of U.S. “national security” elites. It is becoming increasingly apparent that they have painted themselves into a corner, unable to imagine any future path for the United States other than using its still-unparalleled military industrial complex, backed ultimately by the threat of nuclear annihilation, to extend U.S. economic dominance as long as possible. Anything which might require a significantly different distribution of wealth, or even a technology mix that might threaten the pre-eminence of dominant factions, lies outside the realm of permissible discourse in the U.S., a country whose dominant elements have devoted much of their post-Cold War energies to systematically eliminating the mechanisms for peaceful social change. Ideologically foreclosed from learning anything at all from the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have done their best to recreate one of its fatal flaws: a political system where information and new ideas cannot flow upward.
As in most such frenzies over the ambitions of small distant states to acquire one or two of the weapons that the United States possessed by the thousands half a century ago, the fact that this country continues to lead the world in the development of new and improved weapons of mass destruction seldom is mentioned. As North Korea is rumored to be fueling up a missile that may or may not be able to deliver a small payload to the outer reaches of the Western United States, the United States pushes ahead with development of a new generation of missiles and other delivery systems. On June 14th, the United States launched a Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base delivering three dummy nuclear warheads across the Pacific to Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. In the words of the 30th Space Wing press release, the goal of this particular test (for Minuteman flight tests are ongoing) was to “provide key accuracy and reliability data for on-going and future modifications to the weapon system, which are key to improving the already impressive effectiveness of the Minuteman III force.” And as this blog has documented, this is only one small part of a wide-ranging effort to develop the next generation of U.S. strategic weapons, with the intention of being able to strike targets anywhere on earth in hours or less.
Nonetheless, what dissent there is in Washington remains focused on a small range of strategic weapons programs, with disproportionate attention to nuclear warheads. Despite ongoing upgrades to virtually every existing U.S. strategic delivery system, from bombers to sea and land-based strategic missiles, and active planning for a wide variety of new delivery systems including exotic concepts like unmanned long-range bombers and highly accurate, conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, there is little debate about delivery systems. With all mainstream arms control and disarmament organizations apparently having acceded to a supposedly “pragmatic” paradigm that seeks to achieve only what might be accomplished in the next year or two in a Congress dominated by a coalition that runs from neo-fascist militarists to the merely corrupt, bought representatives of the weapons makers, even advocacy of proposals that might sharpen the debate and help reveal the intentions of those in power have largely been abandoned.
One such proposal relevant to the current pseudo-crisis is development of a universal treaty regime for the control of ballistic missiles, beginning with a ban on flight testing long range ballistic missiles. Such a treaty would be easy to verify, as ballistic missile flight tests are impossible to conceal, and distinguishing other kinds of rocket launches from tests of missiles intended for weapons delivery likely would not pose insuperable problems. The Federation of American Scientists, for example, did good work developing this concept in the 1990’s. An attempt to revive the concept a few years ago (by this author and others), however, elicited no interest from the current D.C. “arms control and disarmament community.” In contrast, when speaking to ordinary Americans (and not just the already “converted,”) I found that the idea of a controlling missiles by beginning with a flight test ban is easily understood, and worked to spark reflection even in hostile audiences. It lead easily into substantive discussion of why the United States prefers spending hundreds of billions of dollars to build defenses against long-range missiles to arms control measures that could hold promise of eliminating supposed future “missile threats,” (like North Korea) and to why those in power here feel they need to constantly exercise and modernize the world’s leading arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.
My point, however, is not that a missile control regime beginning with a flight test ban is some magic solution, or even that it is the best strategy to advocate it right now (it probably isn’t). Rather, it is that those who dominate the discourse in “arms control and disarmament” work today have set their sights so low that we are in danger of forgetting altogether what we are trying to accomplish. My own growing conviction is that all work here in the U.S. focused directly on Washington D.C. and international fora should be de-emphasized for the foreseeable future, with most resources devoted to building a movement for real democracy and real peace on the local and regional level capable of changing the boundaries of the politically possible (for more on this, see here and here.) Such things as proposals for a missile control regime, even as an educational tool, remain within the ambit of the professionalized, expert-dominated politics that has come to be the norm across the political spectrum. As such, they fall short of the far more fundamental rethinking and re-direction of our efforts that the real crisis we face–a crisis of democracy, of being citizens of an increasingly repressive state engaged in a series of aggressive wars– requires. As I have written elsewhere,
As Cornell West has pointed out, “without a vibrant tradition of resistance passed on to new generations, there can be no nurturing of a collective and critical consciousness– only professional conscientiousness survives… Without a credible sense of political struggle, there can be no shouldering of a courageous engagement– only cautious adjustment is undertaken.” The last two decades of progressive politics in the United States has been one “cautious adjustment” after another. Across the landscape of mainstream politics, careful careerist professionalism is the rule, courageous engagement is nowhere to be found. It is time to start building traditions of resistance anew. Such traditions cannot be designed by experts, mass-produced, and consumed. We must make them for ourselves, together, and by doing so discover who we truly are.
July 12th, 2006 at 5:46 pm
The Developing Market of Nuclear Weapons Management, and Death of the NPT
The recent North Korean tests cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but rather in the context of a new order in which nuclear weapons become a recognized specie currency in international relations. The indicia of this new Bretton Woods for nuclear arms are emerging: (a) the India-US “gentlemen’s agreement”, (b) the on-and-off negotiations with Iran over its enrichment program, and (c) North Korea’s overt efforts to use its nuclear weapons program to drum up badly needed foreign assistance. I doubt this is an original observation, but the signs are too striking to be ignored.
The chief architect of this developing order is the Bush Administration, which would never openly admit that it is encouraging the founding of an international commodities market in nuclear weapons. The objective of this market is not to actually use such weapons, but to acquire them as a currency of exchange for aid, international recognition and security pacts. The nation which establishes a viable acquisition program, or, like Israel and India, a stockpile, obtains a valuable entry key to a bargaining table of complex dimensions in which acquisition and/or use are bargained for various perks to be earned from the superpowers, beginning with the baseline right not to be the target of a regime change offensive.
The United States has made a calculated decision that a covert nuclear weapons market between nation-states, if carefully controlled and monitored, is a win-win for everyone. Domestically, the nuclear weapons bogeyman will keep solidly in clover such lucrative and expensive programs like anti-missile defense, as with North Korea. If North Korea is able to ultimately strike a nuclear deal with the West, it will gain valuable aid which, for the United States, will be cheap. In the case of India, the non-treaty nuclear weapons “understanding” cemented all sorts of economic and security linkages between the elites in both countries, as well as furnishing Washington with a strong lever against a possibly restive China. This system treats nuclear weapons much like pollution credits, a “negative” commodity bought and sold on the international market. Perhaps a better analogy is the American system of farm credits; if a farmer can be paid not to grow corn, maybe nations can be “paid” in such baubles as nuclear power plants not to grow weapons, or at least, use them.
The seemingly bizarre inconsistencies in Bush’s approach to the acquisition of nuclear technology are part of the overall politics of spectacle to disguise the functioning of the new marketplace. North Korea, despite its economic status in the basement of nations, is far more advanced than Iran both in development of delivery systems and weapons. Yet we are able to turn a blind eye to its actions because we already understand that this is part of the bargaining process, however loathsome we consider its regime to be. No sober policymaker should seriously contemplate that North Korea would actually use a nuclear weapon either on us or Japan with any hopes of avoiding swift transformation into a bubbling plate of radioactive glass. But its missile tests are just the tonic to spur continued infusion of billions into anti-missile defense, a gaping maw which apparently is exempt from any need to prove meaningful success to garner vast budget line-items, whose contractors are scientifically distributed among numerous congressional districts, and which provides an ostensible service - protection from nuclear attack - which blovating House members can never have “too much” of. (As for terrorists uninterested in using such elaborate delivery systems, anti-missile systems have all the relevance of a Maginot line).
In the new nuclear marketplace, there is little incentive for the nuclear weapons states to act on their WMD rhetoric to take more than symbolic economic action against nuclear weapons hopefuls, and such talk serves as a useful cover for the bargaining mechanics of the market. The lessons of India , Pakistan and Israel are too apparent to be ignored; the possession of nuclear weapons can and do reap not only political benefits as well as potential economic windfalls as well. In this realm, the United States “doth protest too much” whenever confronted with an aspiring nuclear power; it quietly adjusts and incorporates the nations’ new status in the web of foreign exchange.
The key victim of this play is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT depends on a collection of “weak” physical forces (sort of like gravity) for its compliance, including international treaty law, the threat of international sanctions, security pacts such as NATO and SEATO, and the carrot of peaceful nuclear technology. The nuclear technology carrot is precisely in play in the new market; the negotiations with Iran indicate the straight line relationship between the threat of weapons acquisition and increasing flow of useful nuclear technology. No developing weapons state has faced more than inconvenient sanctions for its programs, some, like Israel, even less. Iraq simply does not count; the evidence is overwhelming that Iraq’s suspended weapons program merely supplied a duplicitous cover to the United States’ goal in the 2003 war to secure dominance over regional resources, feed an ever-growing defense-related “infrastructure” industry peopled by close associates of the Administration, and as an exercise in “point proving” as Reagan did with Grenada and Panama to satisfy jingoist post 9/11 urges.
What is sad is that the American policy to address nuclear proliferation via a Wild West combination of Adam Smith and Bismark treats as saps courageous nations such as the ex-Soviet republics who voluntarily transported their stockpiles elsewhere, or South Africa which dismantled its advanced nuclear infrastructure built during the long years of apartheid. Instead, nonaligned nations can look forward to a more basic set of rules: (a) nuclear weapons can be used to bargain for good things; (b) nuclear weapons can help deter regime change, or apparently do; (c) nuclear weapons can make some historical enemies think twice before causing more trouble (India-Pakistan), and (d) with a weapon in hand (or almost), all sorts of people start paying attention to you.
The hope for the NPT lies not with Washington or its contingent of arms control devotees schooled in Cold War catechisms. The pressure must come from below, from international organizations, with the continued formation of voluntary regional nuclear weapons free zones and otherwise voluntary compliance by countries uninterested in participating in the new marketplace.
October 9th, 2006 at 5:06 pm
Wow that was a very insightful post. However i do have a question if this “anti missile defence system” does not really exist what is the purpose of the new class ship i keep hearing so much about. Apparently the U.S have a new destroyer solely for the purpose of shooting down enemy missiles. Can you verify this??