U.S nuclear missile test: do as we say, not as we do
Michael Spies
Less than a week after the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution condemning North Korea for test launching several ballistic missiles, the United States is set to launch an unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile on Wednesday from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The missile, carrying three dummy warheads, will be fired across the Pacific toward the missile test range at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, with a flight time of about 30 minutes.
According to the Santa Maria Times, the test scheduled for early Wednesday morning is intended to test the reliability and capability of the missile system. The United States currently deploys 500 Minuteman III missiles, kept on high alert and each carrying a single nuclear warhead with a yield, depending on the configuration, of 170 kT or 335 kT, respectively 10 or 20 times more powerful than the U.S. atomic bomb that devastated Hiroshima.
This test is the latest in an ongoing series of regularly scheduled ballistic missile tests conducted by the U.S. military. In the period between January 2000 and the present, the U.S. has test launched at least 23 Minuteman III ICBMs from Vandenberg. The last test of a Minuteman III occurred on June 14th. Regarding the purpose of the test, Andrew Lichterman pointed out that according to the 30th Space Wing, the goal was to “provide key accuracy and reliability data for on-going and future modifications to the weapon system, which are key to improving the already impressive effectiveness of the Minuteman III force.” He further noted that “as this blog has documented, this is only one small part of a wide-ranging effort to develop the next generation of U.S. strategic weapons, with the intention of being able to strike targets anywhere on earth in hours or less.”
The ongoing conduct of these tests represents yet another example of U.S. exceptionalism; the U.S. feels no embarrassment in criticizing others for the same activities it or its allies engage in. For instance, days after the North Korean tests the Bush Administration “offered an unprecedented defense and rationalization of India’s missile test and nuclear programme” following India’s test launch of a nuclear capable Agni-III missile. The tests of such weapon systems is ill-timed following the international chorus of condemnation, partially led by the U.S., of the North Korean tests. In the regional context of the Korean Peninsula, given the heightened tensions surrounding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the U.S. test of a nuclear capable missile is unambiguously provocative. In the global context, the U.S. missile test is blatant hypocrisy, symptomatic of a dangerous foreign policy based on the imposition of discriminatory, self-serving norms backed by the threat and use of force.
The recent UN Security Council resolution condemning the North Korean tests also exemplifies this one-sided approach to international security, pursued by all the major powers and imposed on the world through their disproportionate influence over inter-governmental bodies. The North Korea resolution reaffirms that the “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.” However, the resolution is silent on the threat to others posed by the continued possession, reliance, improvement and testing of such weapons and their related delivery systems by the permanent members of the Security Council, and, according to the Blix report, the 35 other states that have acquired or developed ballistic missile capabilities.
There is currently no treaty that bans the development or testing of missiles and other delivery systems, nor are there any agreements for their dismantlement. The current non-treaty based Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), ardently backed by the U.S., seeks to rein in missile proliferation through export controls. This is similar to the approach taken in recent proposals for the control of the production of fissile material for civilian nuclear power. Both these initiatives seek to restrict such technologies to states which already possess it.
Yet the logic of this approach breaks down in the face of the reality that the acquisition of these capabilities and technologies directly impact security. On the one hand some states continue to rely on missile technology as an integral aspect of their security forces. On the other hand, states have developed nuclear fuel cycle capabilities for the purpose of energy security in the absence of any guaranteed global supply. In both cases, those states that rely on these capabilities for their own security seek to deny them to others. This is akin to the wolf demanding to be allowed to guard the henhouse.
Ultimately, the present discriminatory, non-comprehensive approach is not stable or sustainable. At best it can only be maintained by the threat or use of force, with Iraq now standing as the model for a major power attempting to rely on military power alone to prevent an adversary from developing certain capabilities and technologies. Yet, unable to handle the present crisis, the Bush Administration blithely marches forward into new crises, endangering the world’s populations, without any plan aside from the false promise of military domination.
July 18th, 2006 at 4:32 pm
And who’s gonna guard your henhouse? I’m sure glad you aren’t guarding mine.
August 27th, 2006 at 7:48 am
When you are testing missiles that deliver 300 or more kilo ton frequency yield explosive resonancy and using dummy warheads, it’s just part of the upgrade and modernization factor so that less innocent regions and their populace become victims in the opinion of Missile Defense graduates although we would all rather reduce react dispose to the points ascribed hereunder in http://understandwordlove.blogspot.com
START III
DESBIC AGENDA:
Article II (Disarmament Conditions)
1. Each Party shall reduce, react, disseminate dispose, decommission, detarget, disguard, disassemble vaporize, neutralize, and destroy all ballistic missile, nuclear warheads and heavy bomber radioactive isotopic and biological armaments. See fit to rescind in every multi or megaton ordnances here sold, in and there that, the aggregate numbers for each and every side for warheads attributable subject to the Provisionment in this Article’s limitations provided for, exceed not more than 10,000 explosive units of calibration persuant with this time tables Texts, Memorandums, Protocols and Annexes here as one START, START II, NPT, INF, and START III and extended Draft inclusive of the for mentioned Treaty Drafted Documents all States are consensually bound and bonded till death do you part standza services appliance men.
(a)In the performance of their duty an Secretary Generals quarter shall move to resolve their differences and reduce, dispose with goal oriented projection set forward for 31 December 2,027 and beyond hereon.
2. Each Party(s’) shall recognize the entry into force of START-II and continue to resolve the particulars of verifiable conclusion by extending START hereof III, there as -IV, and beyond, to the points of assured and binding new solutions thereby the limitations decided to are not to exceed 15 K-ton high graded chemical formulation non blistering agents detergency’s atoms.
Pursuant of START II, but within the limitations set forth as so activations limited to warheads under 15 kiloton and of chemical formulation properties hereto, shall not exceed the limitations provided for thereabout 31 December 2,027: Goals of reprehension able service a specific assembly attribution variants, inasuch orders may follow:
(i) 2,007 (MOAB) Massive Ordnance Air Burst detonation device class of its type, aka, an Daisy Cutter explosive limitation- weapon of attack
(ii) IC Strategic Arms Limitations 31 December 2,007-2,027 way ward to the aggregate limitations provided for by these precepts whereat
(iii) Chemical formulation Properties 15 k-ton attributable limitations provided for instilled hereunder as projected doso agreed:
(iv) Lower level incapacitation chemical formulation properties not to exceed 15 kton as tolerable stockpiles for special detention services detterence, (ICF’S)
(v) Cruise Missiles and Variants of the type not to exceed 4,500 pound warhead = CM
all sales or transfers of cruise missilles of any variance shall be considered unlawful and a punishible crime with penalty assessments incurred to a U N Treasury concept post factus 31 December 2012 except for group 4’s upgrades to stay at constant attribution levels ascribed in this Section to the limitations provided for. No sales to rogue States or under developed aboriginies nor exploitation of these orders Sirs.
(a) the United States of America————, 1,000 and ICF’S 1000 and CM 25,000
(b) the Russian Federation and the former:
Republics to ————————————, 1,000 and ICF’S 1000 and CM 25,000
(c) the Peoples Republic of China————, 1,000 and ICF’S 1000 and CM 25,00
(d) the U N & North Atlantic Treaty Organization–, 1,000 and ICF’S 1000 CM 25,000
(e) the Republic of the Pakistan————–, 100 and ICF’S 100 CM 100
(f) the Peoples Republic of India————-, 200 and ICF’S 200 CM 500
(g) the Peoples State of Israel—————–, 100 and ICF’s 1000 CM 200
(h) the Republic of Japan*———————, 200 and ICF’S 200 CM 200
(i) the combined estimates:
of all other Status quos————————–, 2000 and ICF’S 4000 CM 000
(j) Australia **** par to requestor the secretary General’s and a full U N Security Council for revised numerical contingincies*** 200 and ICF’S 1000 CM 200
(j) Goal Projected Chemical-Properties–HGC (High Graded Chemical) 10 % Percent of the limitations provided for in these estimates Sub totals 660 World 2,027 and 9500 ICF’S Total World 31 December 2027
(k) Total aggregate stockpiles world———-16,100
By up way wardley of the year 31 December 2,027
Total inclusive limitable attributes 15 K-ton—, 555
3. Totals not to exceed MOAB- Daisy Cutter’s- explosive detonation assembly specifications manufacturers post fact us to date 31 December 2,007 limitational attributes. MOAB, so stated herein privately known in military circles as “the mother of all bombs,” carries 18,000 pounds of tritonal explosives, which have an indefinite shelf life shall be the aspecifical largest size explosive projected as agreed upon in this drafted Assemblies.
(a) Having reviewed the reports, it replaces the Vietnam-era “Daisy Cutter,” a 15,000-pound bomb with 12,600 pounds of the less-powerful GSX explosives therehaveit.
(b) Saw as incidentaly’s, originally conceived, so that the MOAB was to be used against large formations of troops and equipment or hardened above-ground bunkers. The target set has also been expanded to include deeply buried targets in concise.
(c) Whereas military officials tell, thereupon the limitations set forth, that the MOAB is mainly conceived as a weapon employed for “psychological operations.” Military officials concur by waywardly for the limitational variant of its type therethat the MOAB will create such a huge blast that it will rattle troops and pressure them into surrendering or not even fighting here withal.
(d) In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of this Provision, the Present Treaty’s observers shall have the right to decide if early warning notification be given. Thereby it is feared that the destructive force of these devices may confound or confuse the opponency distress signals. In and so deceiving that a nuclear or WMD has been exploded thereupon, realizations of nuclear chemical retaliates may concern the altercation here they sided never again wherein to supplies pursue in good faith an open dialogue on this munitions in accordance with this Statute.
4. The Party’s’ undertake to limit bombs being used as called a Massive Ordinance Air Burst (MOAB). This explosive ordnance is said to weighs 9,800kg (21,500 lbs) and it measures ‘bouts 32’ by 12 feet. It’s explosive detonation charge decapitates an area thatof 1.5km (or an 1 mile blast radius), shall be strategic standard government issue by the limitations provided set forth within the bounds of an industrialized emphasis for the largest explosive devices provided for their again by its legal emphasis under the terms of Treaty’s accordance’s..
5. Another said explosive unit of ordnances used is the JDAM of which stockpile contingencies shall remain subject to the limitations provided herein a fore; no such uranium depleting means of cancerous asphyxiations shall be seriously considered safe to usages hereto as an a specifically controlled weapon of attack.
6. In addition, observer missionaries aside from Russia China the USA and UK are to have a say so as reconsider and solidify the use of Cluster Bombs (which spread into hundreds of bomb lets and are deadly to civilians, in and though perspective to such an occasion there to which cancer causing Depleted Uranium (DU)occur. In its own resolve however it may be thought well of a specifically, as far as DU and cluster bombs are concerned, as suchly stated, cluster device have a particular military purpose as so intended:
(a) * Indicated subject to the Secretary General’s U N’s note(s) of charitable checks and placement(s), Indiscrete thereby* 31 December 2,022-27
(b) Whereas 6 % as 83 units of the 666 project able explosive ordnances shall not have a detonation yield or field frequency greater than 15 kilo ton defoliant resonancy’s.
4. Each of the high contracting Party’s undertake not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting Party.
(i) Israeli’s were indeed at first’ lies authorized to silently erase any problem country’s Head of States and or gentiles of they who are caught dealing nuclear weapon’s.
(ii) In saying so the Israeli’s disqualified their authorship from which to protect counterpoint strategic divisions by dealing con-current to this entry’s impetus in ‘cumulative growth and development of said nuclear weapons thatso. In furtherance from a specific I categorical itemization contenders She withholds an disturbing strategic and non-strategic alike anatomical dis-proportionate accumulatative stance for these isotopic imbalancement violation as trafficker that sold. If in any event the doubts seem to persist; use of force American G I will be used to dispel those rumors and remove the doubts until the doubts no longer remain to be questioned as seriously involved in deed as characterized by assassinator attempting to subdue the Golan whereabouts of Tartar. So wise up to us them as such ordered to cease and desist from uranium enrichment sales activities hereby there said as stated so.
5. For the U S A; Russian and Her formerly resolved to redecide discrepancies for the projected time table, there with China such as not more in any variances nor
experimentation, than defoliant detergent to that of an survivable but lethal chemical properties; not to exceed more than 66 unit’s of ordnance with a 15 k-ton yield or less percentile aspect to the extent possible to verify it sold.
6. In order to facilitate the participation and imbalance cooperation of the armistice armed forces /stock piles considerations for the Group sectionals Party’s’ to the 666 illimitably attestered as such; is identifiably contingent stock piles other than the U S A, Russia, NATO, and Greater China, regardless of any situation,
Shall not exceed:
November 10th, 2006 at 7:55 am
[…] Don’t hold your breath waiting for a Security Council resolution condemning the test as jeopardizing international peace and security. That was the Council’s response to the June missile test by North Korea. But as Michael Spies blogged here regarding a subsequent U.S. missile test, the United States, France, and other permanent members of the Council apply different standards (if any) to themselves. Leave a Comment […]